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DA VIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION

COMMISSION: MUDDYING THE CLEAN
MONEY LANDSCAPE
Emily C. Schuman*
Efforts towards campaignfinance reform have always been limited by
the First Amendment concerns inherent to restrictions on political
speech. This Article focuses on state Clean Money public financing
programs-arguably one of the most successful manifestations of
finance reform to date-and how they are threatened by the U.S.
Supreme Court's recent decision in Davis v. Federal Election
Commission in two significant ways. First, Davis halts a recent
judicial trend that had embraced a broad view of anticorruptionas a
legitimate government interest justifying infringement on the First
Amendment. Second, the Court's decision casts serious doubt on the
constitutionality of the trigger mechanisms commonly used in Clean
Money programs to grant certain candidates more than the original,
predetermined allotment of campaignfunds. By adoptinga candidatecentered interpretation of First Amendment interests in the campaign
context, the Davis decision exemplifies the Court's changing approach
to the interpretation of the First Amendment in the election context
generally. Ultimately, this trend will significantly impede the future
effectiveness of Clean Money campaignfinance reform measures.

I. INTRODUCTION

Tom Perriello, a Democrat vying for Virginia's Fifth District
House seat in the 2008 congressional election, stands in front of a red
NASCAR stock car covered with stickers from Chevron, Exxon,
Texaco, and JP Morgan. He rips the corporate stickers off the car
and says, "Corporate sponsorship may work for NASCAR, but not

* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., University of
Michigan. A million thanks to Professor Richard L. Hasen for sharing his infinite wisdom about
election law and for providing me with guidance. Additional thanks to the Loyola Law Review
Developments team-editors and fellow writers-for their unwavering support, especially Nicole
Ochi and Scott Paetty for all of their time and effort. Finally, all of my gratitude and love to my
friends, family, and M.P. because without all of you, none of this would have been possible.
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Congress."' When the sponsorship stickers are all removed, he adds
a "Perriello for Congress" bumper sticker and promises, "I'm taking
zero dollars from corporate sponsors so that I can fight for you."2
Perriello's campaign advertisement capitalizes on the public's
increasing concern that elected representatives "buy" their seat.3 The
public's fear is not unfounded: a political candidate's access to
campaign funds often determines the campaign's success." Indeed,
the more money a candidate raises, the greater his or her chance of
being elected to office. 5 This correlation is the result of politicians'
need for exposure6 in order to reach voters. That is, candidates need
to communicate their campaign message to the masses and become
1. CMAG's Ad of the Week for 10/6/08, http://www.tnsmi-cmag.blogspot.com/2008/10/
cmags-ad-of-week-for-10608.htmil (Oct. 6, 2008, 08:59 EST) [hereinafter CMAG].
2. Id.
3. Frank J. Sorauf, If It's Not Broken... or Is It?, in INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS
AND REALITIES 18 (1992), available at http://www.campaignfinancesite.org/book/pdf/1.pdf
("After the alleged buying of the Congress, it is the alleged buying of the elections to the
Congress that most worries Americans."); see also Robert Barnes, Justices to Hear Challenge of
Law That Affects Self-Funded Candidates, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2008, at A3, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/20/AR2008042001827.html;
WKTV News, Hanna: "Arcuri Selling His Seat in Congress," Sept. 30, 2008, http://
www.wktv.com/explorepolitics/28083379.html.
4. Daniel Weeks, Does Money Buy Elections? The Impact of Spending on U.S.
Congressional Campaigns, AMS. FOR CAMPAIGN REFORM, Jan. 2008, at 1, http://
www.scribd.com/doc/2383850/Does-Money-Buy-Elections ("[D]ata show[s that s]ince 1992...
[n]ine times out of ten, the higher-spending candidate won.").
5. Dan Froomkin, Money Troubles, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Sept. 4, 1998, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/campfin/campfin.htm ("It takes money to pay a
campaign staff and buy materials. It takes money for a campaign to be taken seriously by the
press. It even takes money to raise more money."). But see Weeks, supra note 4, at 2, 5 (noting
that spending requirements for a successful campaign vary according to "communication costs
... [in] the district" and whether the candidate is an incumbent or a challenger). For example,
since 1992, congressional incumbents spending less than $1 million when campaigning were
more likely to win than those spending $1 million or more. Id. at 5.
6. A candidate's exposure, good or bad, influences voters. For example, studies show that
political spot advertisements (which are essentially political commercials) ranging from five
seconds to five minutes significantly affect voters. See Michael Pfau, Tracy Diedrich, Karla M.
Larson & Kim M. Van Winkle, Influence of Communication Modalities on Voters'Perceptionsof
Candidates DuringPresidentialPrimary Campaigns, 45 J. COMM. 122, 124 (2006) (articulating
that televised spot advertising has the highest impact on voter perception in presidential primary
elections in comparison with television news, interviews, and televised debates; newspapers; or
interpersonal communications). Additionally, negative attack advertisements about an opponent
help shape voters' perceptions. See Young Voters Influenced by Negative Political Ads, Says
Study, EUREKALERT.ORG, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.eurekalert.org/pub-releases/2008-02/uocpyvi021208.php (noting that "negative 'attack' ads provoke more voter migration than positive
ads"). Even a candidate's physical appearance affects voters. See LYNDA LEE KAID, HANDBOOK
OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 27 (2004) (describing a study that found physically
appealing candidates generated more positive voter response than their opponents).
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recognizable to the voting public, which typically requires significant

amounts of money.7 Candidates raise funds in different ways; for
example, some financially able candidates fund their own campaigns
with personal wealth, while others rely on donations from individual
sponsors. But, regardless of how each individual campaign is
funded, one thing remains constant: money plays an integral role in
the American electoral process.

In response to the electoral system's increasing dependence on
money and the rising cost of political campaigns, 8 several states have

enacted campaign finance legislation as a means of reform. 9 Often,
this legislation is directed at curbing excessive spending, regulating
sources of funding, and limiting the political influence of special
interest groups and wealthy contributors. 10 One particular type of
campaign finance reform that has proven to be effective and popular
is Clean Money11 public funding, also referred to in this Article as
trigger-based public funding. Under Clean Money public funding

programs, a political candidate voluntarily forgoes his or her right to
raise private funds in exchange for a predetermined amount of
government funding and the possibility of receiving additional funds

7. Weeks, supra note 4, at 8 ("[M]oney matters when it comes to building a baseline of
voter support .... [T]he 'growth potential' in expected votes per unit of additional challenger
spending is very great."); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976); Homans v. City of
Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900, 917 (10th Cir. 2004).
8. Perception Is Reality Public Opinion on Money in Politics and Campaign Finance
Reform, MONEY POLS. RES. ACTION PROJECT, March 4, 2003, http://www.oregonfollowthe
money.org/CampaignReform/poll.htm (citing Poll Conducted by Princeton Survey Research
Association, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 1999) (finding that out of 755 surveyed adults, (1) 87 percent
either are "somewhat concerned" or have a "major concern" that the high cost of campaigns
discourages good people from running for office, and (2) 90 percent either are "somewhat
concerned" or have a "major concern" that campaign contributions have "too much influence on
elections and government policy"); see also David A. Strauss, What Is the Goal of Campaign
Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 161 (1995) (concluding that the role money plays
in the campaign process has consequences including financial inequality among candidates,
misuse of candidates' time in raising funds, and questionable levels of interest-group influence in
democratic politics).
9. See, e.g., infra Part I.B (describing several Clean Money public funding programs
currently in practice throughout the United States).
10. See The Federal Election Campaign Laws: A Short History, http://www.fec.gov/info/
appfour.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
11. "Clean Money" is a term commonly used to refer to publicly financed elections. See,
e.g., Alan Curtis, The Big Picture, in PATRIOTISM, DEMOCRACY AND COMMON SENSE:
RESTORING AMERICA'S PROMISE AT HOME AND ABROAD 59 (Alan Curtis ed., Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2004).
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if and when a triggering event occurs. 12 Triggering events are
typically predesignated funding markers. For example, under some
Clean Money funding programs, a candidate will receive additional
funds if his or her opponent has chosen not to participate in the
program and has raised private funds in excess of a specified
amount. ,3
Though the release of supplementary funds is not guaranteed,
and participants can only depend on receiving a flat sum of money
for their respective campaigns, politicians value Clean Money
programs. " The programs free up time that participating candidates
would otherwise have to spend fundraising and allow them to focus
on their political agenda. 15 Additionally, Clean Money programs
provide candidates with "hefty grants, . . . extra money to combat
opponents who don't participate[,] and . . . more cash to counter

negative ads from third parties." 6 Thus, Clean Money public
funding has many attractive attributes.
The trigger mechanism is one component that is not only
attractive but necessary to make this type of funding work. Without
designated triggers, a candidate who opted in to a Clean Money
program would be limited to receiving only the program's
predetermined amount of funding, which would severely
disadvantage the candidate if he or she faced a privately funded
opponent who had significantly fewer financial restrictions. 17
12. Private funding is money obtained from private organizations, individuals, and the
candidates themselves. It is currently the most common method of fundraising for American
candidates. Richard Briffault, Point/Counterpoint:Public Funding and Democratic Elections,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 566 (1999).
13. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, §1125(9) (2007) (granting participating Clean
Money candidates matching funds when an opposing candidate's funds exceed those of the
participating candidate).
14. See, e.g., Press Release, Citizen Action of New York, Poll Finds New Yorkers
Overwhelmingly Support Public Financing of Elections (Apr. 28, 2008), http://www.citizen
actionny.org/press/latestnews/CEPoll%20Release%20albany/o20final.pdf (stating that New York
Governor David A. Paterson supports Clean Elections). But see id. (stating that Senate Majority
Leader Joseph Bruno "has long stated his opposition to public financing of state legislative
elections").
15. Susan Haigh, Connecticut Candidates Line Up for Public Financing, WASHINGTON
POST.COM, July 19, 2008, available at http://www.ct.gov/seec/lib/seec/archive-programnews/
wpost-_.candidates lineup-for financing.pdf (stating that public funding gives politicians more
time to "get involved with the issues").
16. Haigh, supra note 15.
17. Privately funded candidates are less restricted because although they are subject to their
state's funding regulations, those restrictions are generally "per contribution" limitations rather
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Certainly few, if any, candidates would choose to participate in such
an inequitable funding program.
This Article argues that the United States Supreme Court's June
2008 decision in Davis v. Federal Election Commission"t threatens
the viability of current and future Clean Money public funding
programs because it suggests that triggers are unconstitutional. In
Davis, the Court struck down the Millionaire's Amendment, an
amendment to existing federal campaign finance reform legislation
that created asymmetrical fundraising regulations for U.S. House of
Representatives candidates if an opposing candidate spent $350,000
or more of his or her personal funds on the campaign. '9 The Court
reasoned that the amendment heavily burdened a self-funded
candidate's First Amendment right to make unlimited political
expenditures, a right that the Supreme Court first articulated in
Buckley v. Valeo, the seminal campaign finance reform case.2 o
Although Davis does not address Clean Money public funding
per se, the decision undermines the legal foundation supporting the
crucial trigger mechanism in Clean Money funding in two ways.
First, the Davis court agreed with Day v. Holahan,2 one of only a
few lower court decisions that found trigger-based matching funds to
be unconstitutional. Second, Davis undercuts a previous judicial
trend that expanded Buckley's holding that leveling the electoral
financial playing field is not a legitimate government interest.
At the macro level, Davis indicates a shift in the Court's focus
with respect to campaign finance reform, away from the interests of
the voting public and toward those of individual candidates. The
Court in Buckley used what this Article will refer to as electoratecentered reasoning in its evaluation of campaign finance regulation
by suggesting that the relationship between First Amendment rights
and campaign finance should be structured in a way that best serves
The Davis Court, however, took a different,
the electorate.
candidate-centered approach, which views the First Amendment as a
than a complete funding cap. Arizona's campaign finance law, for example, restricts candidates
in an election for statewide office to $1,010 per contribution from an individual. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 16-905(B)(1) (2009). While the amount per donor is capped under the statute, a
candidate can raise funds from an unlimited number of donors. Id.
18. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
19. Id. at2766-67.
20. Id. at 2759 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
21. 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994).
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means to protect the interests of individual candidates in the
campaign reform context. The Davis approach conflicts with Clean
Money programs because Clean Money restricts an individual
candidate for the benefit of the public, while the candidate-centered
approach in Davis prioritizes the interests of a candidate over those
of the voting public.
Part II of this Article explores the legal support for, and current
implementations of, Clean Money campaign reform. Part III
examines the Court's analysis in Davis, its projected effect on Clean
Money public funding programs, and its current influence on existing
reform legislation.
Part IV analyzes electorate-centered and
candidate-centered approaches and discusses why Davis's candidatecentered approach is antithetical to the progress and improvement of
the American electoral system. This Article suggests that the shift
from an electorate-centered approach to a candidate-centered
approach is a step backwards in an effort to heal the American
electoral system, which is suffering because of the financial demands
it imposes on its participants. Finally, Part V considers implications
of the demise of trigger-based public funding.
II. CLEAN MONEY MECHANICS
Clean Money programs are arguably the most successful type of
public funding scheme. 22 Public funding is a colloquial term for
government- or tax-funded campaigns. 23 In general terms, public
funding requires that the government treasury give cash grants to
candidates for campaign funding in lieu of private funding.24 There
is no uniform vision of, or framework for, public funding in either
theory or practice. Nevertheless, Clean Money is one version of
public funding that has gained substantial support and has been
translated into actual legislation. 25
Seven states and two
22. See Clean Money, Clean Elections: Public Campaign, Full Public Financingin the Age

of the Roberts Supreme Court, http://www.publicampaign.org/node/40409 (last visited Jan. 11,
2009) (describing Clean Money elections as the "most robust option for campaign reform").
23. Bradley A. Smith, Point/Counterpoint:Some Problems with Taxpayer-FundedPolitical

Campaigns, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 592 (1999).
24. Briffault, supra note 12.
25. Common Cause, Public Financing in the States, http://www.commoncause.org/site/
pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=507399 (last visited Jan. 11, 2009) (noting that sixteen states
currently implement some form of direct public financing to candidates, including Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin). See Green
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municipalities employ some version of the Clean Money scheme,
including Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Vermont, and Portland, Oregon, and Albuquerque,
New Mexico. 26 Each instance of Clean Money legislation is unique,

but there is a standard Clean Money model consisting of threshold
qualifying requirements, a fixed amount of funding, and triggerbased matching funds. 27 Maine's Clean Money program illustrates
this standard Clean Money model in practice.
A. Maine's Implementation of the Basic
Clean Money Public FundingModel
The Maine Clean Elections Act ("MCEA") 21 is a voluntary
program available to candidates running for governor, state senator,
or state representative. 2 9 It provides participants with a fixed amount
of government funding and equalizes funding levels between
participating and privately funded candidates by releasing
supplementary public funds to the participating candidate if the
privately funded candidate's expenditures exceed a certain amount. 3o

1. Qualification
Candidates must qualify to participate in the MCEA program by

collecting a specified number of signatures and $5 qualifying
contributions from registered voters within a designated time
period. " Candidates are permitted to privately raise $100 per
contributor in seed money3 2 to fund this qualification period. "
Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 537 F. Supp. 2d 359, 381-90 (D. Conn. 2008) (detailing full and
partial state public funding laws); see also Jason B. Frasco, Full Public Funding: An Effective
and Legally Viable Modelfor Campaign FinanceReform in the States, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 733,
743-87 (2007).
26. Clean Money, Clean Elections: Public Campaign, States/Localities with Clean Elections,
http://www.publicampaign.org/where (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
27. Clean Money, Clean Elections: Public Campaign, How Clean Elections Works,
http://www.publicampaign.org/node/34047 (last visited Jan. 4, 2009) [hereinafter How Clean
Elections Works] (explaining that typical Clean Elections require a candidate to collect a set
number of small qualifying contributions and a limited amount of matching funds if a
participating candidate is outspent by the opponent, independent groups, or individuals).
28. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, §§ 1121-1128 (2008).
29. Id. § 1125.
30. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, The Maine Clean
Election Act, http://maine.gov/ethics/mcea/index.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
31. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 1125(3) (2008).
32. Id. § 1122(9).
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2. Fixed Funding
MCEA participants forgo all private funding and instead receive
a fixed sum from the Clean Money fund. The fund consists of the
candidates' qualifying contributions, residual unspent funds collected
from past participants, tax revenues, fines imposed for selected
offenses, and voluntary donations, among other things.34 The Maine
Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices
regulates the fund.35 Candidates receive varying amounts of funding
depending on the office sought, whether the position is contested,
and whether the election is a primary or general election. 36

For

example, participating candidates in a contested legislative primary
election receive the average amount of money that similarly situated
state senate and house candidates spent in the previous two primary
elections. 3
3. Matching Funds
MCEA provides participating candidates with additional funds
beyond the initial allotment if their opponent's expenditure exceeds
the original grant. If a privately funded candidate's campaign
expenditures, including contributions and independent expenditures,
exceed the original public grant amount, a publicly funded candidate
can obtain additional public matching funds totaling the difference
between the candidates' funds. 38 Additional matching funds are
capped at twice the original grant.39
B. Clean Money Variations in Practice

MCEA exemplifies the standard Clean Money model, but many
variations are used in practice. These programs differ in several
ways, including to whom the funding is available and how the public
fund is financed. "

33. Id. § 1125(2-A).
34. Id. § 1124(2).
35. Id. §§ 1122(2), 1124(1).
36. Id. § 1125(8).
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 1125(9).

Id.
Common Cause, supra note 25.
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1. Eligible Participants
The most extensive versions of Clean Money programs are
Currently, Maine, 41
available to candidates in several states.
Arizona,4 2 and Connecticut 43 are the only states that offer full public
Other states offer funding
funding 4" for all state elections.
for select offices. North
running
programs only to candidates
Carolina, for example, employs a more limited Clean Money
program, which is available only to candidates running for state
judicial offices. 46 Similarly, Vermont's Clean Money system is
available solely to candidates seeking governor and lieutenant
governor positions, 47 and New Mexico provides the option of public
funding exclusively to candidates for the Public Regulation
Commission. 4' Additionally, New Jersey's pilot program, though
recently repealed, was limited to three legislative jurisdictions and
only funded state legislative candidates. "
2. Financing the Public Fund
Clean Money programs generally obtain funding from several
sources to finance the public fund. For example, Maine's program

derives revenue from eight sources. 50 Tax revenue is a common
funding source among state Clean Money programs. One variation
of tax funding, known as tax add-on, gives taxpayers the option of

41. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 1122(1).
42. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-940 to -961 (2003).
43. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-600 to -674, 9-700 to -751 (2008).
44. "Full public funding" means that a participating candidate receives 100 percent funding
from the government and cannot receive any money from private sources, with the exception of
initial seed money, which is a threshold requirement for participation in Clean Money programs.
Other types of public funding programs offer partial funding, in which only a portion of election
costs is subsidized by the government. In Hawaii, for example, the public funding program
provides participating candidates with only 10 to 15 percent of their spending limit, depending on
the office. Common Cause, supra note 25.
45. Common Cause, supra note 25 (mentioning that before its repeal in 2003, Massachusetts
had a Clean Money system that was structured similarly to the programs in Maine and Arizona).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61 (2009).
47. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2851-2883 (2002).
48. N.M. STAT. § 1-19A-2(D) (2003).
49. Common Cause, supra note 25. See George Amick, 'Clean' Candidates Flourish
Elsewhere, NJ.COM, Dec. 8, 2008, http://www.nj.com/timesoftrenton/stories/index.ssf?/base/
columns-0/1228712731193320.xml&coll=5 (noting that the pilot program in New Jersey has
been terminated).
50. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1124 (1996).
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essentially donating money by either receiving less of a tax refund or
just paying more taxes initially. 5 North Carolina, Arizona, and
Vermont provide this option. 52
Another tax-related option, offered in Maine and Arizona, is a
tax check-off, which allows taxpayers to allocate a certain amount of
money on their tax return to be taken out of the amount owed and
does not require an additional payment.53
Other funding sources include voluntary donations,54 residual
money left unspent by past participants,55 and fines imposed for
various state offenses. For example, the Arizona program adds a 10
percent surcharge to civil and criminal fines from various traffic- and
vehicle-related penalties that goes directly into the fund. 56 Vermont,
on the other hand, directs fines collected from violations of the Clean
Money program itself back into the public fund. "
No matter how these programs fund Clean Money elections,
however, many faced legal challenges shortly after their enactment.
The constitutional principles on which Clean Money programs rely
were first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the
seminal public funding case, Buckley v. Valeo.5
C. The Law Supports Clean Money Financing
Schemes: The Supreme Court Upholds
PublicFinancingin Buckley v. Valeo

The principles articulated in Buckley provide the foundation for
public funding schemes. Clean Money legislation, specifically the
trigger provision, consistently faces constitutional challenges under

51. Common Cause, supra note 25.
52. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-954(B) (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.63(b) (2009);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2856(5) (2002).
53. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-954(A) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1124(2)(C) (1996).
54. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 9-751 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1 124(2)(G)
(1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.63(b)(6) (West 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 2856(b)(6) (2002).
55. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-954(D) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1124(2)(E) (1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.63(b)(4) (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 2856(b)(6) (2002).
56. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-116.01, 16-954(C) (2003).
57. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2856(c) (2002).
58. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Most
the free speech provision of the First Amendment. 5 9
challenges, however, have been unsuccessful, and public funding

programs have been upheld. 6
In Buckley, the Supreme Court addressed "by far the most
comprehensive reform legislation (ever) passed by Congress
concerning the election of the President, Vice-President, and
members of Congress." 6 ' The Court found the majority of the
challenged Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") 1974
amendments to be constitutional, including provisions limiting

individual contributions and expenditures for federal office
campaigns and establishing a public funding system for presidential
races. 62
1. Buckley Determines That Expenditure Regulations
Deserve More Scrutiny Than Contribution Regulations
The Buckley Court drew a sharp distinction between limitations
on contributions and on expenditures, ultimately upholding the
constitutionality of limiting the former but not the latter. 63 The Court
opined that expenditure limitations directly inhibit speech protected
by the First Amendment because capping the amount of money a

person can spend on a political campaign "necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed,
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached." 6

59. See infra note 60.
60. See, e.g., ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-952 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-600 to -674,
9-700 to -751 (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121A.030(5)(a) (West 2002) (repealed 2005)
(defeating a constitutional challenge before being repealed); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1125(9) (1996); see also Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov't Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d
445, 472 (1st Cir. 2000) (upholding as constitutional Maine's matching funds provision
corresponding to independent expenditures); Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir. 1998)
("Absent a clearer form of coercion, we decline to find that the incentives inherent in the Trigger
provision are different in kind from clearly constitutional incentives."); Ass'n of Am. Physicians
& Surgeons v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1202-03 (D. Ariz. 2005) (adopting the reasoning in
Daggett and affirming Arizona's matching funds provision as constitutional); Green Party of
Conn. v. Garfield, 537 F. Supp. 2d 359, 392 (D. Conn. 2008) (holding that "triggers do not ...
burden the exercise of political speech").
61. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 143.
64. Id. at 19.
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Conversely, the Court determined that contribution limitations

do not directly restrain protected speech because a contribution's
expressive value rests solely on the "symbolic act of contributing"
rather than on its size.65 The contribution itself is once removed
from being the contributor's political speech because the contributor
does not directly dictate how the contribution is used. Rather, the
contribution's recipient spends the contribution to promote his or her

political message. 66 Consequently, the amount that a contributor
donates to a candidate is not germane to the contributor's ability to
"speak."
2. Buckley Finds Only One Valid Government Interest
One of the most important aspects of the Buckley decision is the
Supreme Court's finding that only one legitimate government

interest justifies infringing on candidates' First Amendment rights in
a campaign context: limiting the actuality and appearance of
corruption. 67
The Court acknowledged

contribution

and

expenditure

that the challenged legislation's

limitations

"both

implicate[d]

fundamental First Amendment interests, 68 but went on to explain
that constitutional rights in the political context are not absolute. 69
Instead, the Court found that while "[t]he First Amendment affords
the broadestprotection to such political expression,""7 the broadest

65. Id. at 21.
66. Id. ("[T]ransformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone
other than the contributor.").
67. Id. at 27; see also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) ("Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials
are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to
themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the
financial quidpro quo: dollars for political favors.").
68. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976). The Court said that political speech is
protected by the First Amendment because "there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs . . . of
course includ[ing] discussions of candidates .. " Id. at 14 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214, 218 (1966)). The Court also acknowledged that restricting the amount of money a person or
group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces expression by
limiting the number and depth of issues discussed, as well as the size of the audience reached. Id.
at 19. This is because virtually every means of mass communication costs money. Id.
69. Id. at 25.
70. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
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protection allows government to "abridge" such expression if it

presents a "constitutionally sufficient justification" "' for doing so.

72

Justice Kennedy's dissent in McConnell v. Federal Election

Commission,73 the first campaign finance-related case that the
Supreme Court heard after Buckley, clarified the standard by which
the Court intended "constitutionally sufficient justifications" to be
evaluated. Justifications for expenditure limits, Justice Kennedy
said, were subject to strict scrutiny, while those for contribution

limits were subject to "closely drawn" scrutiny, a less stringent
review. "
The Buckley Court held that preventing corruption or the

appearance thereof was a sufficient government justification for
legislating contribution limits that infringe on First Amendment
rights.75 On the other hand, the Court found that "[n]o governmental
interest that ha[d] been suggested [was] sufficient to justify the
restriction on the quantity of political expression imposed by . . .
campaign expenditure limitations."7 6 The Court drew this distinction
because it found the danger of large contributions "buying" political
influence77 and the public perception that large contributions lead to
political quid pro quos7 8 to be legitimate concerns. 79 The Court
concluded, however, that personal,8 0 independent,81 and campaign 2

71. Id. at 26.
72. Id. at 25.
73. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
74. Id. at 308 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("In Buckley, we applied 'closely drawn' scrutiny [a
less exacting review] to contribution limitations and strict scrutiny to expenditure limitations.").
75. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29.
76. Id. at 55.
77. Id. at 26 ("[L]arge contributions [may be] given to secure a political quid pro quo
from.., office holders.").
78. Id. at 27 (defining the appearance of corruption as "public awareness of the opportunities
for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions").
79. Id. at 27 (describing corruption and the appearance thereof as "pernicious practices [that]
can never be reliably ascertained [but that are] ... not ... illusory").
80. Personal expenditures are those made by a candidate or the candidate's family. Id. at 53
(stating that personal expenditures "reduce[] the candidate's dependence on outside contributions
and thereby counteract[] ... coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse").
81. Independent expenditures are those made by individuals and groups, including political
parties that fail to place a candidate on the ballot. Id. at 46-47 (stating that independent
expenditures do not involve the same possibility of corruption because they are made
"independently of the candidate and his campaign," which takes the threat of a quid pro quo out
of the equation).
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expenditures did not pose the same risk of corrupt quidpro quos and,
therefore, the anticorruption justification did not constitutionally
validate expenditure regulations. 83
Moreover, the Court rejected the government's interest in
leveling the playing field 84 to reduce the wealthy "voice" in
elections 85 because "restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment... ."86 Further, the Court concluded
that a person's First Amendment rights should not be compromised
simply because of his or her financial ability to participate more
extensively in the political process. 87
Accordingly, the Court validated only anticorruption as a
legitimate government justification for infringing on First
Amendment rights, and only with respect to contribution
limitations.8 8 This determination is momentous because it provides a
very narrow basis for constitutional campaign regulation. If a court
determines, as it did in Davis,89 that a campaign finance regulatory
provision does not further anticorruption efforts, Buckley suggests
that there is no other constitutionally sufficient purpose to justify it.
3. Buckley Deems Public Financing Constitutional
In Buckley, the Court ultimately upheld publicly financed
presidential elections as constitutionally valid.9 Its decision hinged
on the fact that candidates voluntarily subjected themselves to
expenditure
limitations,
which
reduced
the
otherwise

82. Campaign expenditures are those made for the candidate's campaign by the candidate or
"any other person that is 'authorized or requested' by the candidate." Id. at 55 n.60; see also id.
at 55 ("[Ajlleviating the corrupting influence of large contributions is served by... contribution
limitations and disclosure provisions rather than by... campaign expenditure ceilings.").

83. Id. at 45, 53, 55.
84. Id. at 48 (stating that equalizing the playing field is "equalizing the relative ability of
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections").

85. Id. at 25.
86. Id. at 48-49.
87. Id. at 49.

88. Id.
89. Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008). See discussion infra
Part III.A.
90. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 142-43.
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unconstitutional burden 9' and made the public funding scheme
legitimate. 92
The plaintiffs argued that the funding scheme was inconsistent
with the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. 93 The Court
flatly rejected the claim and asserted an electorate-centered
understanding of the First Amendment with which public funding
comports. It stated that public financing "facilitate[s] and enlarge[s]
public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals
vital to a self-governing people... [and does] not abridge[] pertinent
First Amendment values." 94
III.

DAVIS V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION:
DEBASING TRIGGER-BASED PUBLIC FINANCING

In June 2008, the Court decided Davis, which struck down the
Millionaire's Amendment, a federal statutory provision that created
asymmetrical 95 funding regulations for self-funded and non-selffunded U.S. House of Representatives candidates. 96 The regulations
were asymmetrical because they held self-funded candidates to
standard campaign finance regulations, while imposing less stringent
fundraising limitations on non-self-funded candidates upon the

occurrence of a triggering event. "
Although Davis does not directly implicate Clean Money public
financing, it calls into question the constitutionality of trigger
mechanisms. What is troublesome to the future of Clean Money
programs is not so much the Davis holding as the Court's discussion
in reaching its conclusion: namely, the Court's endorsement of Day

91. Id. at 50 (noting that expenditure limitations unconstitutionally burden First Amendment
rights).

92. Id. at 100-02.
93. Id. at 90, 92.
94. Id. at 92-93.
95. Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2771 (2008) (explaining that the
funding was asymmetrical because it "impose[d] different contribution limits for candidates who
are competing against each other").
96. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (finding the Millionaire's Amendment to be unconstitutional).
97. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2006) (laying out the standard federal campaign finance
limitations), with 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1 (setting out campaign finance limitations for non-self-funded
candidates campaigning against a self-funded opponent). For more details about the Millionare's
Amendment's provisions, see discussion infra Part III.A.
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v. Holahan and its revitalization of Buckley's holding that equalizing
the financial playing field is not a legitimate government interest. 9'
A. Davis v. Federal Election Commission: How
Many People Does It Take to Fund a Campaign?
In Davis, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
section 319(a) and (b) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 ("BCRA"), 99 also known as the Millionaire's Amendment. 100
Section 319(a) provided that if a self-funded candidate's personal
expenditures exceeded those of a non-self-funded candidate by at
least $350,000, the latter received relaxed fundraising limitations. 101
Specifically, the non-self-funded candidate would have unlimited
access to coordinated party expenditures-expenditures by political
party committees on behalf of their candidates ' 2-while the selffunded candidate would be restricted to the current $40,900
limitation. 03 The non-self-funded candidate would also be entitled
to a more relaxed individual contribution limit that was three times
greater than that of the self-funded candidate. 104 For example, the
Millionaire's Amendment raised the contribution limit from $2,300
to $6,900 per individual contributing to plaintiff Jack Davis's nonself-funded opponent's campaign, while the $2,300 contribution
limit remained for donations made to Davis. "'
The Millionaire's Amendment created a formula to determine
The formula added a
when to enact asymmetrical funding.
98. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772, 2759.
99. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1. This Article references the statute challenged in Davis as "BCRA
§ 319(a) and (b)" or the "Millionaire's Amendment" to maintain consistency with the language in
the Davis opinion. In actuality, however, BCRA § 319 was merely the conduit that added the true
statutory provisions at issue: Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA") § 315A(a) and
(b). Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2766 n.3.
100. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2766-67.
101. Id. at 2770. If a non-self-funded candidate received relaxed funding limitations and as a
result exceeded the $350,000 difference as compared to his or her opponent, then he or she would
once again be subject to the original limitations. Id.
102. R. SAM GARRETr & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE:
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COORDINATED PARTY EXPENDITURES IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: AN
OVERVIEW (2007), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/84325.pdf.
103. Price Index Increases for Expenditure and Contribution Limitations, 72 Fed. Reg. 5294
(Feb. 5, 2007) (limiting national and state political party committee expenditures to $40,900 for
House of Representative elections in states with more than one House seat).
104. Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2766.
105. Id. at 2766-67. Though legally entitled to additional funding, Davis's opponent never
exceeded the normal contribution limits. Id.
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candidate's personal expenditures to 50 percent of his or her funds
from other sources for the election at issue, the sum of which was a
statistic called the opposition personal funds amount ("OPFA"). 106 A
difference greater than $350,000 between two candidates' OPFAs
triggered the application of asymmetrical limitations. 107 To monitor
the candidates' OFPAs, section 319(b) provided several disclosure
requirements and timelines. 108
Davis-a self-funded 109

U.S.

House

of

Representatives

candidate-claimed that section 319(a) unconstitutionally burdened
his First Amendment right to make unlimited expenditures. 110 He
argued that section 319(a) inhibited him from making expenditures
because it used his expenditures to determine when his opponent
could acquire additional funding that would theoretically be used to
finance speech injurious to his campaign. "' The Court sided with
Davis, holding that the Millionaire's Amendment violated his First
Amendment right to spend freely on his own campaign. 112
B. Davis Threatens the Legal Foundation
of Clean Money Financing
Two components of the Court's opinion are particularly
disconcerting for the future of Clean Money programs. First, the
Court subjected section 319(a) to strict scrutiny, and contrary to prior
campaign finance jurisprudence suggesting a broadening trend in
defining the government's anticorruption interests, 1 3 reverted to
106. Id. at 2766 n.5. The OPFA is measured at specified dates throughout the year prior to
the election. Id. at 2766.
107. Id. at 2766 n.5.
108. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-l(b)(1)(B)-(D) (2006) (requiring self-financing candidates to file three
types of disclosures: (1) a "declaration of intent" specifying the amount of personal funds over
$350,000 that the candidate anticipates spending within fifteen days of entering the race; (2) an
"initial notification" within twenty-four hours of reaching $350,000; and (3) an "additional
notification" for every additional $10,000 expenditure over $350,000 within twenty-four hours of
making it).
109. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2767 (noting that during his 2004 campaign, Davis spent over $1.2
million of his own money, which made up the majority of his funding, and in 2006, Davis
personally financed all but $126,000 of his $2.3 million campaign expenditures).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2770.
112. Id. at 2771-74; cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51-54 (1976) (holding that federal
candidates can spend limitlessly toward their campaigns because it is a violation of First
Amendment rights for FECA to regulate a federal candidate's personal campaign expenditures).
113. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New
Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L.
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Buckley's narrower application of the anticorruption justification. 114
Second, the Court endorsed Day, evidencing the Court's current
unfavorable disposition towards the constitutionality of Clean Money

trigger-based programs.
1. Davis Stunts a Judicial Trend of a
Liberal Buckley Application
Davis applied Buckley's public funding-related holding that

"equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates"

15

is not a

legitimate or compelling government interest. 116 Though Buckley's

holding was never overturned, in the years following the decision,
the Supreme Court and lower courts seemed to broaden the scope of
the anticorruption government interest laid out in Buckley by
recognizing financial equality in the electoral process as an important
and valid governmental consideration. 117
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, "' for example,
demonstrates this broadening trend. "9 In Austin, the Court upheld
corporate expenditure limitations for the first time by applying an
expanded definition of government anticorruption interests.
Specifically, the Court veered away from Buckley's understanding of
anticorruption, which amounted to avoiding political quid pro
quos, 12 and recognized a "different type of corruption in the political
arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations
of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form
and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the
corporation's political ideas." 121 The Court seemed to embrace the
REV. 31, 43 (2004) (discussing a shift in the 2000s that "sufficiently expanded the definitions of
'corruption' and 'the appearance of corruption' to justify campaign finance regulation").
114. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773 ("[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are
the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting
campaign finances." (alterations in original) (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985))).
115. Id. at 2771 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54).
116. Id. at2771-75.
117. See Hasen, supra note 113, at 31 ("[I]t appears that the Court's jurisprudence is moving
in the direction [of] ... upholding campaign finance laws that promote a kind of political equality
.. 'to democratize the influence that money can bring to bear upon the electoral process ....
(quoting Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 253 (2002)).
118. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
119. Id. at 659-60 (describing a broadened concept of corruption).
120. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
121. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. at 660.
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government's financial equalization interest, but avoided a direct
conflict with Buckley by labeling it a "different type of
corruption," 122 thus folding it into an anticorruption rationale.
Also significant in this Buckley expansion was Justice Breyer's
concurrence in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC. 23 He
offered that the Court cannot literally interpret Buckley's proposition
that the First Amendment does not support a "government [that] may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others ...

," 124 To the contrary, Justice

Breyer said that "[t]he Constitution often permits restrictions on the
speech of some in order to prevent a few from drowning out the
many ..

"25

Further, Justice Breyer advocated that the Court

should defer to the legislature's judgment as to whether "unlimited
spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process" '26 rather
than place an absolute ban on certain electoral monetary
regulations. 127
Lower courts also took a less-than-literal approach to
interpreting Buckley.
For example, the court in Daggett v.
Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices 128 found
that the state's matching-funds provision, which was triggered by
independent contributions made to nonparticipating candidates (i.e.,
funding contributed by individuals other than the candidate), was
constitutional. It reasoned that the matching-funds provision was
crucial in reaching "the state's goal of distributing roughly
proportionate funding, albeit with a limit, to publicly funded
candidates." ' 29 Thus, the court acknowledged, and seemingly
accepted, the state's interest in leveling the financial field.
Davis's explicit statement that the Constitution does not permit
the government to "level electoral opportunities," 13° however,
provides support for future trigger-related Clean Money challenges.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
Shrink, 528 U.S. at 402.
Id. at 403-04.

127. Id.
128. 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000).
129. Id. at 470.
130. Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008).
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Clean Money opponents now have a Supreme Court opinion to
worth of campaign-reform-friendly
combat several years'
jurisprudence.
2. Davis Alludes to Clean Money
by Citing Day v. Holahan
The Davis Court also adopted precedent that was antithetical to

the

majority

of cases

upholding

Clean Money

legislation.

Specifically, the Davis majority cited Day v. Holahan, ' an Eighth
Circuit case finding that Clean Money triggers violate the First
The Day court concluded that increasing a
Amendment. 32

candidate's spending limits and granting him or her an additional
public subsidy as a direct result of an opponent's supporter's
independent expenditure "chills the free exercise of that protected
This "chilling," the court explained, leads to selfspeech." '
censorship, which is "no less a burden on speech that is susceptible
to constitutional challenge than is direct government censorship." "'
Prior to Davis, many lower courts discredited Day. They
adopted Buckley's electorate-centered view of the First Amendment
that trigger provisions further First Amendment purposes rather than
obstruct them as Day suggested. "' Additionally, courts had the
ability to reject Day because the Supreme Court had not spoken
specifically on the issue. '6 The Court seemed to quietly accept, if
131. 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994).
132. Id. at 1361.
133. Id. at 1360.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., North Carolina Right to Life Comm. Fund v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 437-38 (4th
Cir. 2008) (rejecting plaintiffs' reliance on Day's "unpersuasive" decision that matching funds
chill speech, because Day relied on a flimsy comparison to a factually distinguishable case in
order to support its conclusion); Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov't Ethics & Election Practices, 205
F.3d 445, 464-465 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting the "logic of Day" because it "equate[d] responsive
speech with an impairment to the initial speaker" and mischaracterized the First Amendment's
protection of speech because it provided "no right to speak free from response," but rather should
"secure the 'widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources'
(citations omitted)); Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 537 F. Supp. 2d 359, 391 (D. Conn. 2008)
("reject[ing] Day's logic" on the grounds that while "[an individual or candidate may decide, as
a strategic matter, not to speak as a result of the campaign financing system ... he is in no way
prohibited from exercising his right to free speech"); Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v.
Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1202 (D. Ariz. 2005) (adopting the reasoning in Daggett because
cases following Day "cast doubt" on the decision).
136. Many of the appellate cases that challenged trigger-based matching-funds provisions
were denied a writ of certiorari. See, e.g., North Carolina Right to Life Comm. Fund v. Leake,
524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008); Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101
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not approve, the national campaign finance reform movement by
refusing invitations to review Clean Money constitutional challenges.
Davis instantly burst any notion of implied authorization.
Though Davis does not explicitly discuss matching funds or the
trigger provisions addressed in Day, it resurrected Day's precedent,
suggesting the direction in which the Court, and lower courts
following its lead, will head. Davis uses Day indirectly to make the
point that an asymmetrical funding scheme 137 triggered by personal
campaign expenditures penalizes self-funded candidates for
exercising protected First Amendment rights, "' just as the Day court
held that trigger-based funding penalizes an individual for making an
independent expenditure in favor of his or her candidate of choice. 139
The Court's parallel here is hard to ignore. It will be difficult for
lower courts not to make the same connection. Davis's endorsement
of Day will make courts think twice before rejecting Day's precedent
as they so often did before Davis. 140
C. The Likely Demise of Clean
Money Financing After Davis
The Supreme Court decided Davis less than a year ago, but the
decision has already stifled Clean Money programs. For example, in
McComish v. Brewer, 14 a U.S. district court in Arizona interpreted
Davis broadly to suggest that trigger-based funding is
unconstitutional. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction to prevent candidates from participating in
Arizona's Clean Money program. The McComish court cited Davis
as controlling precedent and expressed a broad, rather than factspecific, interpretation of the Davis decision.

F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1229 (1997); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995).
137. Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2771 (2008) (describing the section
319(a) asymmetrical funding scheme as "discriminatory fundraising limitations").
138. Id. at2771-72.
139. Day, 34 F.3d at 1360.
140. But see The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 375, 385
(2008) (opining that Davis was intended to, and will, be read narrowly to apply only to
asymmetrical expenditure limits and will not "stretch" to implicate the constitutionality of
asymmetrical funding schemes).
141. No. CV-08-1550-PHX-ROS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83307 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2008).
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[T]he Davis [C]ourt focused not merely on the fact that the
contributions limit differs for participating and nonparticipating candidates, but on the fact that "the vigorous
exercise of the right to use personal funds to finance
campaign speech produces fundraising advantages for
opponents in the competitive context of electoral
politics."... [It] expounded on the constitutional dangers
of such a scheme, writing that while one does not "have the
right to be free from vigorous debate," one "does have the
right to be free from government restrictions that abridge its
own rights in order to 'enhance the relative voice' of
opponents." 142
Thus, McComish suggests that all existing Clean Money legislation
is endangered.
Some may argue that the McComish court's refusal to grant a
preliminary injunction indicates that Davis will not be successful in
derailing Clean Money programs. The court only denied the motion,
however, because participating candidates would have been
drastically handicapped in the rapidly approaching election if the
motion were granted and funds were immediately revoked. "' This
reasoning indicates that its denial of the motion does not foreshadow
the court's ultimate conclusion regarding the program's
constitutionality. To the contrary, in its evaluation of the motion, the
court got a glimpse of the merits 144 and made no secret of its opinion
that plaintiffs had a "very strong likelihood of success on the
merits." "' Therefore, despite the small victory for Clean Money
with respect to the motion for a preliminary injunction, it is likely
that Arizona's Clean Money program will eventually face more
significant setbacks following McComish as a result of Davis.
Legislators, as well as jurists, are interpreting Davis broadly and
halting their campaign finance initiatives.
In New Jersey, for
example, efforts to develop a Clean Money program known as the

142. Id. at *19 (quoting Davis, 128 S. Ct at 2772) (emphasis in original).
143. Id. at *35-36.
144. Id. at * 11 (indicating that the two Ninth Circuit standards of review for preliminary
injunctions require the court to evaluate each case's likelihood of success on the merits).
145. Id. at *36.
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2009 New Jersey Fair and Clean Elections Pilot Project Act 146
officially ceased as a result of Davis and McComish. 147 The New
Jersey Legislature met during summer 2008 to determine how Davis
would affect its own "rescue funds" provision. 148 It concluded that
the provision was unconstitutional in light of the recent Supreme
Court decision, and that the Clean Money legislation would be
ineffective without that provision. 149
In sum, Davis's holding quickly resonated throughout the public
funding world. It has already left its mark on the Clean Money
public funding landscape by impeding Clean Money programs, such
as the Arizona program in McComish, and prompting the elimination
of others, such as the pilot program in New Jersey.
IV. DA vIs SHIFTS THE COURT'S FocuS FROM
ELECTORATE-CENTERED TO CANDIDATE-CENTERED
FIRST AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION

Until Davis, courts typically took an electorate-centered position
when evaluating the interplay between public funding and the First
Amendment. Specifically, pre-Davis courts viewed trigger-based
matching funds as furthering the First Amendment's purpose by
enabling and encouraging political speech. 150 This interpretation is
146. Center for Competitive Politics, Wishful Thinking, http://www.campaignfreedom.org/
blog/id.681/blog.detail.asp (Aug. 18, 2008).
147. New Jersey Election and Finance Law Blog, New Jersey Clean Elections Program
Dead-For Now,
http://eleclaw.blogspot.com/2008/09/new-jersey-clean-elections-programdead.html (Sept. 2, 2008, 08:18 EST) (referencing Federal Court Effectively Kills NJ Clean
Elections, POLITICKERNJ.COM, Sept. 2, 2008, http://www.politickernj.com/editor/23014/federalcourt-effectively-kills-nj-clean-elections).
148. Rescue funds allot candidates competing against high spenders up to $75,000 and an
additional $75,000 if faced with attacking issue-advocacy groups. Gregory J. Volpe, Court
Ruling May Affect Election Finance: Clean Elections Program in N.J. Aids Those Running
Against Rich Opponents, DAILYRECORD.COM, July 6, 2008, http://www.webberforasse
mbly.com/news/DR-CourtRulingMayAffectElectionFinance.pdf.
149. New Jersey Election and Campaign Finance Law Blog, Legislators to Meet to Address
Rescue Funds Provision for Clean Elections Program Reauthorization, http://eleclaw.blog
spot.com/2008/08/legislators-to-meet-to-address-rescue.html (Aug. 4, 2008, 12:36 EST). See
also Matt Friedman, Panel Meets to Determine Clean Elections Future, POLITICKERNJ.COM,
Aug. 4, 2008, http://www.politickernj.com/matt-friedman/220 11/panel-meets-determine-cleanelections-future (reporting legislators' recognition that "[i]t would be very difficult to convince
candidates to [participate] without rescue money" (quoting New Jersey Senator Bill Baroni)). But
see Election Law Blog, "Clean Elections on its Death Bed," http://electionlawblog.org/
archives/01 1488.html (Sept. 8, 2008, 08:34 PST) (suggesting that "the Arizona decision is a fig
leaf for shelving the New Jersey public financing program").
150. See, e.g., Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov't Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 464
(1st Cir. 2000) ("[T]he provision of matching funds does not indirectly burden donors' speech
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electorate-centered because it allows campaign finance regulations
and the First Amendment to coincide, which this author believes is in
the best interests of the electorate, or voting public. The electorate
should hear from all candidates to relatively equal degrees because it
enables the most informed and most genuinely democratic electoral
process. ' Clean Money trigger-based programs are electoratecentered because they increase speech-enabling funding for
participating candidates and balance the information available to
voters, both of which advance the electorate's interests.
By contrast, a candidate-centered approach to the First
Amendment as it applies to matching public funds merely promotes
the best interests of an individual candidate's campaign. That type of
system produces a disproportionate amount of information from
candidates who are best financially equipped to spread their message.
This is undesirable because it can potentially skew electoral results
by altering the amount and balance of information the electorate has
to form political opinions and ultimately to cast an intelligent vote.
A. Perspectives of the First Amendment and
Democracy Shape the Electorate's Best Interests
What exactly are the electorate's "best interests"?
The answer to this question goes directly to the long-standing
debate about the First Amendment's role. Traditionally, the First
Amendment's objective was understood as "a shield, as a means of
protecting the individual speaker from being silenced by the state." 152
This perspective views government regulation as inherently adverse
to free speech, so that protecting autonomy of the individual speaker
is in the collective's best interest. "' Davis's candidate-centered
approach mimics this understanding of the First Amendment.

and associational rights.
Appellants misconstrue the meaning of the First Amendment's
protection of their speech. They have no right to speak free from response-the purpose of the
First Amendment is to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources." (internal citations omitted)). But see Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1366
(8th Cir. 1994) (holding that providing a candidate with additional funds when expenditures made
on behalf of an opponent reach a certain level "impairs" the opponent's supporters' political
speech).
15 1. There is much debate over democracy and its interplay with the electoral process. See
discussion infra Part IV.A.
152. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408 (1986).
153. Id.
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Alternatively, the electorate-centered approach is based on a
different understanding of the First Amendment's purpose. It sees
free speech as a conduit to democracy, understood to be a "promise[]
[of] collective self-determination-a freedom to the people to decide
their own fate-and presupposes a debate on public issues that [is
uninhibited]." 154 The electorate-centered approach shifts the First
Amendment's protectee from the "soapbox"'
speaker to the
listener 56 because it recognizes that government regulation of the
electoral process can facilitate democracy.
Davis's candidate-centered approach, which protects autonomy
in the electoral context, conflicts with a true democracy's goal of
selecting representation "because we believe it the best, not because
it is the only thing we know." 157 Clean Money programs exemplify
government action that establishes and regulates a framework that
furthers a genuine democracy. They provide the electorate with
diverse information from a variety of political schools of thought,
thereby affording the public the best opportunity to elect truly
representative candidates.
An unregulated candidate-centered
system, on the other hand, "produce[s] a public debate that is
dominated by those who are economically powerful," ' 58 and

therefore breeds default representatives. The preservation of a true
American democracy should be at the forefront of the First
Amendment's agenda.
B. Judicial Evolution of First Amendment Interpretation
from Buckley's Electorate-Centered Approach to
Davis 's Candidate-Centered Approach
The Buckley Court articulated its electorate-centered mentality
when it stated that "the central purpose of the Speech and Press
Clauses [is] to assure a society in which 'uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open' public debate concerning matters of public interest would
thrive, for only in such a society can a healthy representative

154. Id. at 1407.
155. Id. at 1408.
156. Id. at 1417.
157. Id. at 1416.
158. Id. at 1412.
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democracy flourish." "' The Court viewed public funding as a means

to "facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the
electoral process" and not to "abridge, restrict or censor
speech ...., 160 It conducted its public funding evaluation through
an electorate-centered lens by supporting the electorate's access to
more political information with which to create an intelligent,

democratic electoral process. 161
Other courts also recognized the value in establishing an
electorate-centered system, and this arguably influenced their legal
discussions about trigger provisions. For example, in Wilkinson v.
Jones, 162 the court stated that "the trigger provision promotes more
speech, not less." 163
Additionally, the court in Rosenstiel v.
Rodriguez 16' agreed that "the State's scheme 165 promotes, rather than
detracts from, cherished First Amendment values." 166 Hence, courts
valued and prioritized a heightened level of political discourse that
not only benefits an individual candidate in his or her campaign, 167
but also provides the voting public with the tools to make a truly

informed decision.

168

Davis represents a noticeable departure from this priority.
Rather than follow the electorate-centered analysis-giving

159. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
160. Id. at 92-93.
161. Kenneth N. Weine, Triggering the FirstAmendment. Why Campaign Finance Systems
That Include "Triggers" Are Constitutional, 24 J. LEGIS. 223, 235 (1998) ("Because democracy
requires a diverse discourse, First Amendment jurisprudence embraces the government's
financing of a competing speaker.").
162. Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
163. Id. at 928.
164. 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996).
165. The scheme's trigger provision provided an "expenditure limitation waiver, which
permit[ted] a publicly financed candidate to exceed the expenditure limits while retaining the
public subsidy when opposed by a nonparticipating candidate who ha[d] spent or received
contributions beyond the triggering amounts spelled out in the statute... " Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d
at 1551.
166. Id. at 1552.
167. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) ("[T]he total amount raised and spent by each candidate, and hence the candidate's speech
power, would be increased by the sums contributed from the public coffers ....).
168. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976) (stating that "[d]emocracy depends on a
well-informed electorate, not a citizenry legislatively limited in its ability to discuss and debate
candidates and issues").
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significant weight to the value of "enlarged public discussion" "'the Court voiced an alternative perspective. Indeed, Davis focused
on the impact that the Millionaire's Amendment had on individual
candidates rather than on the electorate at large. The opinion gave
more weight to the "penalty" 170 that the amendment imposed on
candidates' First Amendment right to make political expenditures, 171
than to the First Amendment goal of "secur[ing] the 'widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources ....

,,,

172

The Court's view that giving one candidate additional funding
reduces another candidate's speech implies that campaigning is a
zero-sum game, a tug-of-war among candidates that necessarily takes
from one what it gives to another. 173 This view reduces the
campaigning process to a finite pool of benefits and burdens that are
distributed among the candidates, and eliminates the electorate's
interests as a key consideration.
V. CONCLUSION

Davis undoubtedly attacks the core of Clean Money public
funding schemes. Though the debate rages on, it is hard to ignore
the tacit implications of its holding. The Tom Perriellos of the
world 174 might continue to symbolically rip Exxon stickers from
their cars and "fight for you" despite the lack of assistance available
to them to run a competitive campaign. But to what end and for
what purpose? Without structured programs to help candidates
unlock the golden handcuffs offered by "big money" donors, they
will willingly stay locked in, because there is no alternative.
Unless Clean Money programs remain viable, American
democracy will continue to be tainted by the by-product of an
unregulated, money-demanding campaigning system resulting in a
169. Id. at 92-93.
170. Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 2771 (2008).
171. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48 (finding that capping independent expenditures is
unconstitutional because it does not satisfy any substantial government interest and because it
heavily burdens the protected First Amendment right to "vigorous advocacy").
172. Id. at 49 (internal citation omitted).
173. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2780 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Extrapolating from the zero-sum
nature of a political race, Davis insists that any benefit conferred upon a self-funder's opponent
thereby works a detriment to the self-funding candidate.").
174. See supra Part I.
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less than adequately informed electorate.
Given the critical
importance that money plays in elections, legislatures must be free to
implement appropriate and effective remedies. Clean Money has
proven to be one of the most successful means to combat this
unfortunate reality, yet the Davis opinion strikes at the heart of the
Clean Money framework. With the trigger mechanism in question, it
is safe to say that Clean Money faces a muddy future.

